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IN OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Aid to Education
The long awaited study by the legal department of the National Catholic Welfare
Conference on the topic, "The Constitutionality of the Inclusion of Church-Related
Schools in Federal Aid to Education," has
finally appeared in print in the current
issue of the Georgetown Law Journal. The
precise question to which the study is addressed is: May the federal government, as
part of a comprehensive program to promote educational excellence in the nation,
provide secular educational benefits to the
public in private nonprofit schools, churchrelated as well as nondenominational?
Three related questions are not treated:
the basic constitutionality of federal aid to
education; the constitutionality of federal
aid to education exclusively in public
schools; and the constitutionality of federal
aid to religious instruction.
While no conclusion is expressed respecting the desirability, in principle, of
large-scale federal aid to education, it is
clear that it would be both needful from
the viewpoint of national policy and lawful
from the viewpoint of constitutionality to
assist the secular aspects of education in
church-related schools if such large-scale
federal aid should be undertaken.
The specific conclusions to which the
study comes are as follows:
(1) Education in church-related schools
is a public function which, by its nature, is
deserving of governmental support.

(2) There exists no constitutional bar
to aid to education in church-related
schools in a degree proportionate to the
value of the public function it performs.
Such aid to the secular function may take
the form of matching grants or long-term
loans to institutions, or of scholarships, tuition payments, or tax benefits.
(3) The parent and child have a constitutional right to choose a church-related
educational institution meeting reasonable
state requirements as the institution in
which the child's education shall be
acquired.
(4) Government in the United States is
without power to impose upon the people
a single educational system in which all
must participate.
With respect to policy considerations,
the study establishes that it is in the national interest that every American child
have the opportunity for an education of
excellence. But it is also in the national
interest that our Judaeo-Christian moral
heritage be preserved, along with the freedom to acquire education in diverse, nonstate institutions. Herein lies the unique
public value of our church-related schools.
While our great public school system built by men of all faiths - should receive
the particular interest (as it does the financial support) of those who are dedicated to
church-related schools, it is also true that
the immense public contribution of the
latter schools should be better known.
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These schools were the original source
of American popular education. Far from
deviating from the American educational
tradition (which was one of hospitality to
religious values) they stand at the very
core of that tradition. Today, Catholic
schools (the largest of the groups of our
church-related schools) are providing education (recognized by the states as meeting
essential citizens' needs) to four and a half
million elementary school children and one
million high school children - or about
13 1 of the total school population of the
nation. In nineteen states whose school
population represents half that of the
nation, Catholic schools are providing
education to 18.6% of all children in elementary and secondary schools. For the
year 1960 alone, the Catholic educational
system saved American taxpayers $1.8
billion.
However, one of the principal public
benefits attributable to the Catholic schools
is not economic but social. Typically, the
Catholic schools are a meeting place for
children of different economic and ethnic
backgrounds and have usually not been
located according to de facto zoning which
divides neighborhoods racially. They have
historically proved an invaluable training
ground in the preparation of citizens for
full participation in a pluralist society.
Their graduates are found everywhere in
American life, contributing commonly with
all other citizens, to the welfare of the
American society.
If, as seems true in the current educational crisis, all of the country's means of
education should be utilized to their fullest
extent, then (unless constitutional considrations dictate to the contrary) sound polcy requires that if the federal government
)fiers large-scale aid to education, this

should include education in private, nonprofit schools, church-related as well as
nondenominational.
With respect to constitutional considerations, the study establishes that they fully
support these policy requirements. The provisions of the federal constitution chiefly
involved in discussions of federal aid to
education in church-related schools are the
"religion" clauses of the first amendment
and the "due process" clause of the fifth
amendment. Historically, it is clear that the
Founding Fathers did not and would never
have written into their Constitution any
clauses which would be aimed at sterilizing
all public life and institutions of religious
content. Opponents of aid to churchrelated education, however, rely principally
on the language of the first amendment
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." When
this clause was drafted it was understood
to mean that Congress could not create a
national church or give any religion a preferred status. This "no establishment"
clause was aimed at preventing governmental transgressions upon religious liberty
and not at preventing all relationships even certain cooperative relationshipsbetween church and state. Certainly it was
never understood to mean that religious
institutions which perform public services
are disqualified to receive compensation
for them through the governmental organs
of the society which has benefited by the
services. Neither was it understood to mean
that government may proffer its assistance
to the health and education of our citizens
only through secularized governmental institutions. No decisions of the United States
Supreme Court contradict these last-stated
points; in fact, the Supreme Court deci-
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sions which are closely relevant support
them.
There are three decisions of the Supreme
Court which relate to the constitutionality
of aid-providing by government for the accomplishment of public welfare objects
through church-related institutions. Not
only do none of these decisions hold such
aid-providing unconstitutional, they all
flatly affirm its constitutionality. These decisions are Bradfield v. Roberts,L Cochran
v. Board of Educ.,2 and Everson v. Board
of Educ.3
Two further Supreme Court decisions,
widely cited in the controversy over federal
aid to education in church-related schools,
are McCollum v. Board of Educ. 4 and
Zorach v. Clauson.5 Each dealt with the
constitutionality of "released time" programs in the public schools and so is not
in point with respect to the present discussion of aid-providing by government, save
insofar as each contains comment upon the
general meaning of the "religion" clauses
of the first amendment. The McCollum
case involved a released time program conducted on the public school premises and
carefully integrated into the public school
program; this was held unconstitutional.
The Zorach case involved an unintegrated
program conducted off the public school
premises, and this was held to be constitutional. Since the majority opinion in the
McCollum case spoke three times of the
first amendment's creating a "wall of separation between church and state," some
commentators believed that the Supreme
Court had stated a doctrine of absolute
1

175 U.S. 291 (1899).

2 281 U.S. 370 (1930).

3330 U.S. 1 (1947).
4 330 U.S. 203 (1948).
5 343 U.S. 306 (1952)

separation of church and state and that the
way had now been prepared for the liquidation of fruitful relationships between government and religion which had been the
American experience of one hundred and
sixty years. The decision of the Court four
years later in Zorach proved these commentators wrong.
In Zorach the Supreme Court made it
clear that the concept, derived from the
first amendment, of separation of church
and state was not to be taken in any absolute sense. The Court stated that "we are a
religious people," and that religion and
government may in various ways cooperate.
Neither the McCollum nor the Zorach case
constitutes in any sense precedent against
the kinds of possible aid to education in
church-related schools under discussion in
the study.
A third group of Supreme Court decisions relevant to the discussion is Meyer v.
Nebraska6 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.7
These involved the all important rights of
free choice in selecting educational institutions. The Meyer case involved the violation, by a teacher in a Lutheran parochial
school, of a state statute making it a crime
to teach in any elementary school any language other than English. The United
States Supreme Court reversed the conviction, stressing that there are three groups
of rights which the Constitution protects
against unreasonable intrusion by the state:
those of the child, of the parent and of the
teacher. The Court struck forcefully at the
view that all educational rights belong te
the state, and it said that the desire of the
legislature to "foster a homogeneous people" could not be fulfilled at the expense of
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.
6262 U.S. 390 (1923).
7268
U.S. 510 (1925).
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The landmark case of Pierce v. Society
of Sisters involved an expanded recognition
of parental and child rights in education.
Here an Oregon statute (which had been
promoted by the Ku Klux Klan and some
allied groups) required that parents send
their children only to public schools. The
plan of the statute was to "Americanize"
all children in what was described as the
"public school melting pot." Protestants,
Jews and Catholics rose in opposition to
the scheme. The Supreme Court of the
United States ruled the statute unconstitutional as denying the rights of parent and
child freely to choose education in nonpublic (including church-related) schools.
The Court said that the legislature could
not give the state a monopoly over education. Most significantly it said:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon
which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only.
The child is not the mere creature of the
State ....8
The Meyer and Pierce cases thus
strongly underscore the protection with
which the American Constitution jealously
surrounds individual rights in education.
Each stresses child-parental rights and by
clear implication attacks the concept of the
statist culture which would result from the
permitting of government monopoly of education. Having thus considered present
questions of policy and, in addition, the
governing constitutional law, the study
gives some consideration to probable future
consequences of programs of massive federal aid to public education which would
exclude church-related education. The predictable result would be a critical weaken8
Id. at 535.

ing of the latter, presaging the ultimate
closing of many church-related schools.
Since, de facto, most parents would no
longer enjoy the freedom to send their
children to church-related schools, the freedom of parent and child protected by the
Pierce decision would, practically speaking,
have been rendered meaningless.
Moreover, a practical governmental monopoly of education would result. This
would not only dangerously transform our
free, pluralistic society but would also pose
the most serious problems respecting freedom of belief. Freedom of belief would be
endangered by the fact that virtually all
children would be compelled to attend
state-run schools. Values are inculcated in
all schools, not only in those in whose curricula specific ethical or social concepts are
advocated, but also in schools whose curricula distinctly omit such concepts. For
the person whose conscience dictated the
choice of a church-related school, here as
a matter of practicality would be the result
discountenanced in McCollum: coercion to
participate in schooling, the orientation of
which is counter to belief.
The study concludes by observing that
the present argument over aid to education
has unhappily become overclouded by
opinions which have tended to engender
the belief that the problems here involved
are to be solved by simple, absolutist interpretations of the Constitution and by
generalizations based thereupon. Ours,
however, is a Constitution of rationality,
not one of absolutes which paralyze social
action. The problems here involved are
predominantly practical; no constitutional
bar exists to the aid herein described to
education in church-related schools. Constitutionally proper forms may be found in
which such aid may be given. Practicalities,

8

not slogans, should govern the determinations to be made - determinations which
give clear recognition to the rights of parents, the rights of children, the enlargement
of freedom, and the preservation of the
nation.
The Ribicoff Memorandum
Another excellent presentation on the
subject of aid to education is an article in
the Winter edition ,of Thought magazine
(published at Fordham University) by an
outstanding scholar, Rev. Joseph F. Costanzo, S.J., assistant professor of political
philosophy at Fordham. Entitled "Ribicoff
on Federal Aid to Education," this treatise
is an exhaustive and analytical presentation. Father Costanzo's thesis is that a
law-supported program that extends federal aid to all schools, except parochial
ones, precisely because of their religious
affiliation, is unjust, unreasonable and unsound. The treatise gives excellent material
on the Everson, McCollum and Zorach
cases.
In his introduction, Father Costanzo
quotes as follows from the text of President
Kennedy's special message sent to Congress on Feb. 20, 1961:
Our progress as a Nation . . . will require
the maximum development of every young
American's capacity. The human mind is
our fundamental resource. A balanced federal program ... must include equally determined measure to invest in human beings.
...Our twin goals must be: a new standard
of excellence in education - and the availability of such excellence to all who are willing and able to pursue it.
The author then remarks:
It was indeed regrettable to many loyal
Americans that such universal affirmations
of educational needs in the case of students,
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teachers and facilities, all "unequivocally"
related to our Nation's progress should have
been so quickly contradicted by the President himself in outlining discriminatory
norms for the disbursement of federal
funds. ....

(The same discrimination was repeated by
the President in his State of the Union
address.)
Father Costanzo continues:
On March 28, 1961, Mr. Ribicoff, Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare, in response to a request made by Senator Morse,
chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on
Education, sent the latter a memorandum
discussing the constitutionality of loans to
private schools, including sectarian institutions, and a summary of existing federal
legislation which benefits sectarian institutions. Because the memorandum is, in its
own way, an official document of opinion,
it could be easily misconstrued as an authoritative interpretation of the historical
practices of governmental aid to education.
Actually it is no more than a cabinet officer's
report committed a priori and ex officio to
the support of his Chief Executive. To acknowledge frankly the restricted purpose
and loyal service of the memorandum is not
to deride it.
There are many excellent passages in
Father Costanzo's article, which covers 51
pages in -Thought. We append some of
them:
There is no basis in constitutional law, in
the history of higher and lower education,
or in sound reason to warrant the distinction
whereby the Federal government may favor
with financial assistance in any form churchrelated colleges and universities and on the
other hand be required to deny it in all
forms to their subsidiaries in the pre-collegiate grades.
The constitutional principles on which
federal subsidies to the church colleges and
universities are based also justify the extension of government assistance to their gram-
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mar and secondary schools. A Constitutional
principle which defends support of sectarian
schools on the one level and denies it on
another level - both of which in the minds
of the churchmen themselves cohere as a
continuous educational process - cannot be
established validly.
Father Costanzo concludes:
Unfortunately, the discussion has been
partly obfuscated in the popular mind by
uncritical and specious associations. A religious establishment is not an establishment
of religion. The Constitution forbids a state
religion; it does not proscribe a religious
state. There is nothing in the Constitution
that requires tax-supported education to be
wholly secular and divorced from religious influence and orientation nor any
requirement that public education and general welfare be identified with state schools
exclusively.
Separation of Church and State is not and
cannot ever be separation of religion and
education. Church schools are not religious
schools as are seminaries, ministry and rabbinical schools. They are truly educational
facilities that comply with state educational
standards and requirements of teaching and
curriculum - even when considered within
their own religious orientation, environment
and influence. Religious instruction in accredited private schools needs no apologia
within the context of America's religious
heritage. The national interest depends as
much upon their vigorous survival as it does
upon state schools.
A religious and moral imperative is at
the heart of American culture. Successive
generations of Americans have prided themselves on the spiritual and religious wellsprings of our democratic way of life. It is
not without profound significance that the
most revered and time-honored document
in our national history is the Declaration of
Independence, which protests to the whole
world the birth of a new nation in terms of
self-evident truths.
In the international struggle to contain
Communist totalitarianism and dehumani-

zation Americans look to religion as a principal ally and major defense for the preservation of the free way of life. At home
there is a general consensus among the people and government officials that our democracy rests more firmly upon religious
foundations and that our civil liberties are
ultimately justified by the spiritual concept
of the dignity of man, the validity of which
is beyond any social mores to arrest or
majoritarian determination to defeat. The
unique American experience has been to
hold fast to these religious presuppositions
of our institutions, on the one hand by exercising no legal constraint over the consciences of its citizens and on the other by
providing equal protection of laws and legal
immunity for the free exercise of religious
liberty. It is in the national interest for all
schools to retain this relevance of religious
life and the spiritual values implied in our
democratic institutions. No legal prejudice
or disability should be visited upon those
who do.
Church and State
The latest and best articles dealing with
the relationship between church and state
appear in the November Michigan Law
Review and the Autumn issue of the Chicago Law Review. Professor Kauper's
paper entitled "Church and State: Cooperative Separatism" is featured in the Michigan journal, while Professor Kurland's
survey, "Of Church and State and the Su-

preme Court," occupies a similar position
in the Chicago periodical.
According to Professor Kauper, a number of groups and organizations are devoting new study to questions of church-state

relations in order to clarify their position.
While to some it may seem that the term
"separation of church and state" solves

such questions, it has become clear to the
more thoughtful observer that the relation-

ship between the political and the religious
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forces of the community, all operating
within the same social structure, and often
serving concurrent or overlapping purposes,
and drawing upon the same basic human
resources and personnel, is a matter too
complex to be described by use of slogans
or symbols. Indeed, the problems attending this relationship are too difficult to be
solved by doctrinaire propositions or
absolutes.
"Separation of church and state" is the

symbolic language so often used as a beginning point of discussion. Actually this
precise language does not have much relevancy to the American scene. It is borrowed from European history and tradition
where the problem could be identified in
terms of a single church and of a single
state, or in later years of a single state and
two churches, namely, Catholic and Protestant. To speak of separation of church and
state in the United States invites some difficulty in the use of terms, first, because we
have a plurality of states including the
federal government and the individual
states and, second, because we have a
plurality of church bodies. Perhaps it would
be more illuminating to identify the subject

in terms of the problems arising out of the
interrelationship of religious and political
forces in the community. This interrelationship creates the problem in which we
are interested. Use of the term "state"
denotes the politically organized community with its monopoly of coercive power.
The church on the other hand, is a voluntary association which must depend on
noncoercive religious motivation and persuasion in making its impact upon the
individual and the community. In any critical examination of this general problem of
church-state relation and more particularly
of the nonestablishment limitation, it is
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useful to start with the elementary idea
that the state and the church serve basically
different functions and objectives. It is the
state's business to operate the politically,
organized society and serve the community's civil needs. The business of the
church is to minister to man's spiritual
needs and to carry on activities appropriate
to a sense of religious concern. Some may
prefer not to put it in this way, but rather
to say that the state is concerned with the
secular functions of our society and the
churches with its spiritual functions. This,
too, may be a gross oversimplification, but
it does, at least, point up a central consideration, namely, that church and state
serve different primary functions. It is not
the business of the state to operate a church
or to engage in the propagation of religious
ideas. On the other hand, it is not the
function of the churches to exercise the
coercive authority of the politically organized community. This separation of function has its roots not simply in some
theoretical conception of a convenient division of labor but is grounded more profoundly on the theory that the cause of
human freedom is best served when religion and its institutions are grounded in
voluntarism and not dependent upon political force. The really important questions
we face today, however, do not arise from
any threat of formal confusion of functions
or any attempt at formal institutional blending of the separate functions of the church
and state. Rather they have to do with the
practical problems of the recognition of
each other's function and of the contribution that each makes to the total scheme of
things. As the church is dependent on the
state and depends for its effective functioning and even survival on valuable services
furnished by the state, so, in turn, the politi52
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cally organized community expects to be
served by the religious community. The
tradition developed in English legal history
that the Chancellor was the keeper of the
King's conscience. This term epitomized
the idea that the King counted upon conceptions of equity developed by the Chancellor who was an ecclesiastical officer to
liberalize the common law and to infuse it
with moral conceptions that had a basic
religious orientation. This, in turn, is simply another manifestation of the idea that
the churches, in the discharge of their separate functions in cultivating the spiritual
lives of their parishioners and in developing
moral and ethical ideas founded on religious insight and motivation, make an
important contribution to the politicallyorganized community. The state in formulating policy and in fashioning the law must
depend upon the moral sense and values
of the community. It makes little difference
whether we recognize the church's contribution to the legal order and to the conception of public policy in terms of a body
of moral or natural law which serves as a
guide or norm for the framing of positive
law or, whether apart from any conception
of natural law, we identify this contribution
to the civic order both through the impact
of religiously motivated citizens and public
officers and the discharge by the church
of a prophetic function in speaking to matters of public concern. In regard to such
matters as disarmament, the use of nuclear
weapons as war weapons, birth control,
distribution of surplus food to needy peoples, immigration policy, aid to education,
aid for the aged, the churches do have a
real, vital interest. These are matters of
both religious and civic concern.
Professor Kauper concludes by stating:

This writer is not advocating federal aid for
parochial schools. But it is his opinion that
consistent with the non-establishment principle of the first amendment and the separation limitation derived from it, and in view
of the interpretations given to this language
and the practices that have been sanctioned,
Congress may grant some assistance to these
schools as part of a program of spending
for the general welfare, so long as the funds
are so limited and their expenditure so directed as not to be a direct subsidy for religious teaching.
It is clear that we cannot find answers to
any of the questions in the field of churchstate relations by employing broad and
sweeping postulates based on a theory of
complete separation or on a theory that the
state can do nothing which in fact aids religion. These problems will have to be answered on a pragmatic basis that takes
account of competing and conflicting interests and of the underlying purposes served
by the separation principle. But it should
also be stressed that the issue of constitutional power should not be confused with
the question whether it is desirable or wise
as a matter of policy for the government to
give support to parochial schools. Certainly
any proposal for such support does invoke
very important policy considerations. On
the one hand, the effect of such assistance
in promoting parochial schools and the resulting impact and effect on the public
school system must be considered and
weighed. And, in turn, those interested in
the parochial schools must seriously and
carefully weigh the question whether and to
what extent they should receive and accept
assistance from the government at the expense of submission to controls that properly accompany grants of public funds. But
these are questions of policy to be debated
and argued in the public forum and in the
legislative halls. Debate on these issues
should not be foreclosed or obscured by
indiscriminate invocation of the separation
principle derived from the first amendment.
Professor Kurland's review of the
church-state issue also supports the view
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of those who believe, as Professor Kauper,
that aid to church-related schools poses an
issue of public policy rather than law. Professor Kurland concludes his article with
the following paragraph:
This paper has stated and examined, in
the context of the Court's opinions, a principle believed to be appropriate to the first
amendment objectives. The principle tendered is a simple one. The freedom and separation clauses should be read as stating a
single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses, read together as
they should be, prohibit classification in
terms of religion either to confer a benefit or
to impose a burden. This test is meant to
provide a starting point for the solution to
problems brought before the Court, not a
mechanical answer to them. Perhaps such a
search for rules of decision is futile or undesirable. Certainly the recent plea for
"neutral principles" of constitutional adjudication has not met with uniform acclaim.
Only if equality and certainty are still fundamental objectives of our legal structure do
such principles have a function to serve.
And perhaps this notion of law is outdated
in the society in which we live. But no
apologies are offered for the belief that
democratic society cannot survive if these
elements of the rule of law are rejected.
Law and Morals
Another excellent article from the pen
of Professor MacGuigan appears in the
latest issue of Current Law and Social
Problems. Entitled "Positive Law and the
Moral Law," it outlines St. Thomas
Aquinas' conception of the relationship of
law and morals and develops some of the
conclusions which seem to be implicit in
his doctrine.
According to Professor MacGuigan there
is for St. Thomas a mutual interpenetration
of law and morals. Some -moral obligations
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are also legal obligations (static norms),
and all legal obligations are moral obligations, either primarily and necessarily
(static norms) or secondarily and prudentially (dynamic norms). In fact, St. Thomas
even goes so far as to say that legislative
determinations which are unjust (and
therefore, by his own definition, not law at
all) may sometimes be binding in conscience for prudential reasons, that is, in
order to avoid the greater evils of scandal
and disturbance. St. Thomas does not confuse the moral and legal orders. He clearly
sees the essential features of each and distinguishes them effectively. But for him
distinction is not separation, and so far is
he from adopting a theory of the separation
of law and morals that he posits a massive
penetration of each into the realm of the
other.
As a result of this interpenetration of"
law and morals two advantages accrue as
deduced by Professor MacGuigan. First,
the guidance given to law by .the natural
law and its derivative, natural morality,
though not descending to the purely practical level of prudence, is considerable.
Secondly, by making all legal rules moral
precepts, either primarily or secondarily,
this theory makes possible a moral and
rational explanation of all law; legal obligation becomes explicable in rational terms
and law thus gains the support of reason
as well as the adherence of will. The
Thomistic theory of the interpenetration of
law and morals thus gives both speculative
satisfaction and practical assistance to man
as political animal.
Fair Housing Laws
Nine states - Colorado, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon and
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Pennsylvania -now forbid discrimination
in the sale or rental of housing on the basis
of race, color, religion, national origin or
ancestry; moreover, these laws cover not
only public housing, publicly assisted housing (urban renewal) and publicly insured
private housing (FHA- or VA-insured)
but apply as well to extensive portions of
private housing that is not governmentally
aided, not even by government insurance
on mortgages. This coverage of entirely
private housing is the really distinctive feature of these laws. From this fact they are
called "fair housing laws in private housing," although their broad provisions also
include public, publicly assisted and publicly insured housing.
The January 1962 issue of Social Order
contains an excellent discussion of these
laws in an article by Richard Roberts, S.J.
entitled "Fair Housing Laws: A Tool for
Racial Equality."
Father Roberts surveys the major provisions of anti-discrimination laws in private
housing in the aforementioned states and
then discusses the arguments pro and con
with respect to such legislation. A leading
claim against the passage of these laws is
that fair housing laws in private housing
violate the right to control of one's own
property. Freely to select one's buyers or
tenants is among the important benefits of
private property ownership. To curtail the
landlord's freedom of selection is to deprive him of a right essential to his freedom,
a right forming an important part of the
American tradition. Although zoning laws
and similar state regulation of private property in the interest of the general welfare
are admittedly proper, fair housing laws, it
is asserted, are not of this nature but instead constitute an unreasonable and arbitrary deprivation of rights. Moreover, thus

to abridge the property owner's freedom is
to convert private housing into a public
utility, for the mark of a public utility is
that the public has a right to demand its
services without discrimination.
Opponents also argue that not only do
fair housing laws impair the right of private
property ownership but they also infringe
on the right of freedom of association of
the owner who chooses to live in his property. No longer is he free to select the
persons with whom he associates in connection with his own property, neither is he
free to enjoy the correlative of the right of
'"freedom of association" which is the
"freedom to non-associate." Thus, under a
fair housing statute, a landlord is not free
to rent other apartments in his building to
members of his own religion only, rejecting
all others.
It may be remarked that this argument
from the right of "freedom of association,"
while primarily applying to the owneroccupier, is capable of wider applications.
Tenants in a building also have a right, it
is claimed, to freedom of association and
may legitimately protest the entrance of a
tenant with whom they do not choose to
associate.
Opponents also argue that the true purpose of those advocating fair housing legislation in private housing is not the provision of better housing for minorities but
the compulsory integration of the races.
These opponents stress they do not oppose
voluntary integration; they insist, however,
that integration should be a matter of free
choice. And the choice should work both
ways: those who wish to live in a racially or
nationally homogeneous apartment building or neighborhood are entitled to this
liberty, as much as those preferring a mixed
residential pattern.
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A leading argument in behalf of fair
housing statutes is based on the natural
and inherent right of every individual and
family to bargain for shelter and to move
freely into any neighborhood, without exclusion or penalty because of race, color,
religion or national origin.
A second argument employed by fair
housing law proponents stresses that the
practical effect of this ghetto-containment
is to confine the Negro and other minorities
to slum areas. Denied access to the new
housing market or other desirable sections,
in city after city Negro families are largely
restricted to the oldest and most overcrowded districts. An unfavorable image
of the minorities is unfairly created and
reinforced by this compelled association
with slum residents.
Contested also, is an opposition argument that is couched in the familiar phrase
''you can't legislate morality." Fair housing
advocates deny the parallel that foes would
draw between these laws and the Prohibition Amendment and Volstead Act of unhappy memory. Rather, they counter,
anti-discrimination laws in housing give
formal expression to the moral, democratic
conviction of the community that housing
discrimination is wrong. This in itself is
healthful. In addition, proponents point to
the successful operation of existing antidiscrimination legislation in housing and
other fields.
Father Roberts expresses his own opinion on fair housing legislation in the following concluding paragraph:
Whatever answers history may write to
these questions, in the current social context fair housing laws in private housing
are, in the present writer's view, both just
and necessary. The status of a free man is
simply not consonant with his deprivation
of an equal place in the housing market, by
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the virtually concerted forces of the housing
industry and the community hostility, solely
because of race, color, religion or national
origin. This deprivation is a current fact,
demanding the remedy of legislative power.
Also meritorious is a second argument that
state action is imperative, since housing discrimination is one of the causes of a major
social evil, the urban slum. Fair housing
laws in private housing, then, bear the hallmark of legislation that is practical, just and
wise. And this they do, even though the
citizen may still be surprised at his government's entry into areas of conduct long considered beyond its scope.
Labor Law
The concern currently expressed by
several large and powerful national organizations about racial and religious discrimination in employment, and the attention
given to the problem by both major political parties at their 1960 conventions, portend renewed efforts to enact federal
legislation providing legal remedies to persons suffering such job discrimination.
In an article by Walter Maloney, Jr.
entitled "Racial and Religious Discrimination In Employment and the Role of the
NLRB" featured in the current Maryland
Law Review, certain definite observations
are made concerning such legislation. According to Mr. Maloney, the NLRB has
realized the inherent limitations of the National Labor Relations Act in affording an
'effective remedy for racial and religious
discrimination in employment. Congress
clearly did not have this problem in mind
when it brought the Board and its act into
existence, nor when it expanded the powers
of the Board in 1947. Whenever racial and
religious problems have arisen in the course
of Board litigation, they have come up
incidentally in some peripheral context of
the administration of the act.
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It has been ably argued that the Board
could, in filling up the broad interstices of
the act, assume a more vigorous and comprehensive role in eliminating racial job
bias. It has been suggested that the duty of
a union to bargain under section 8(b) (3)
of the act encompasses a duty owed to its
-constituents as well as to its economic protagonist. Accordingly, racial discrimination
in employment, or at least in collective
bargaining, would be deemed as an unfair
labor practice. Mr. Maloney argues that
such an argument does not accord due
deference to Congress. However compelling the reasons may seem to be for federal
action in the area of racial and religious
job bias, Mr. Maloney feels that it is of
paramount importance to accede to the
expressed wishes of the body which the
Constitution has designated for the creation
of new law and new policy. When Congress
has failed to set such a policy, an administrative body would be ill-advised to attempt, by a flanking action, what elected
representatives have declined to accomplish by frontal assaults.
Hostility to federal job bias legislation
cannot reasonably be expected to subside,
even in the face of the most modest proposal. However, the degree and intensity
of such opposition may become modified if
the proposal advanced is clearly remedial
in character and does not contain express
criminal sanctions. This practical end may
be accomplished by a proposal making
racial and religious discrimination a new
and distinct unfair labor practice on the
part of either labor organizations or employers to be remedied under the established procedures of the NLRB.

Contingent Fees
Fortune magazine has an article entitled,
"The Crisis in the Courts," in its December
1961 issue. According to the article, most
plaintiffs' lawyers work on contingent fees,
picking up from 25% to 50% of their
clients' awards or settlements. This system
is defended on the ground that it provides
counsel for the most impoverished accident
victims. Its vices are more glaring: the
contingent-fee system clogs the calendars
with thousands of small, weak suits that
should never have been brought; juries,
knowing that the plaintiff's lawyer will get
a third or more of the award, inflate their
verdicts far beyond actual damages and,
naturally, this tendency has the effect of
increasing premiums for liability insurance.
A few plaintiff lawyers in nearly every big
city solicit likely cases against "target defendants" (rich ones) and, in. flat violation of professional ethics, advance funds
to support clients until trial time. In California a special bar commission reported
some contingent fees "unreasonable and
unconscionable," but the state bar membership refused to set maximum limits of
33%1/3 7 of the first $20,000 and 20%
above that. The New York Supreme Court's
Appellate Division in Manhattan and the
Bronx limits fees to 331/3 % with exceptions for special cases. In New York City
alone, according to the article, accident
awards run $220 million a year to 160,000
people; no less than $75 million of that
*amount goes to lawyers. The American
Judicature Society, hard core of the courtreform movement, estimates that contingent fees in the United States may run as
high as $700 million annually.

